Dubium 1, Response, part g, Reference to St. Thomas

Here is first the dubium:

1 Dubium about the claim that we should reinterpret Divine Revelation according to the cultural and anthropological changes in vogue.

After the statements of some Bishops, which have been neither corrected nor retracted, it is asked whether in the Church Divine Revelation should be reinterpreted according to the cultural changes of our time and according to the new anthropological vision that these changes promote; or whether Divine Revelation is binding forever, immutable and therefore not to be contradicted, according to the dictum of the Second Vatican Council, that to God who reveals is due "the obedience of faith"(Dei Verbum 5); that what is revealed for the salvation of all must remain "in their entirety, throughout the ages" and alive, and be "transmitted to all generations" (7); and that the progress of understanding does not imply any change in the truth of things and words, because faith has been "handed on … once and for all" (8), and the Magisterium is not superior to the Word of God, but teaches only what has been handed on (10).

Here is part g of the response to that dubium:

g) It is important to emphasize that what cannot change is what has been revealed "for the salvation of all peoples" (Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution Dei Verbum, 7). Therefore the Church must constantly discern between that which is essential for salvation and that which is secondary or less directly related to this goal. In this regard, I would like to recall what St. Thomas Aquinas said: "the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects" (Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, art. 4).

Let me analyse:

i

"It is important to emphasize that what cannot change is what has been revealed "for the salvation of all peoples" (Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution Dei Verbum, 7)."

Sounds like, saying from the inverse side, "what has not been revealed for the salvation of all peoples" can change.

ij

"Therefore the Church must constantly discern between that which is essential for salvation and that which is secondary or less directly related to this goal."

Sounds like, saying, the Church should look for nooks and crannies of things hitherto thought essential to salvation and see if really they aren't and if therefore we could change.

iij

"In this regard, I would like to recall what St. Thomas Aquinas said: "the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects" (Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, art. 4)."

First, sounds like, saying that details can readily be non-salvific;
Second, after looking at the reference, it sounds a bit like saying "revelation is really a bit like the natural law" ...

This means, one should look at the reference:

Article 4. Whether the natural law is the same in all men?
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2094.htm#article4

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is not common to all men; because, as it is written (Romans 10:16), "all do not obey the gospel." Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.

Objection 2. Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men.

Objection 3. Further, as stated above (Article 2,Article 3), to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things; some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for all.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 2,Article 3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.

It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.

Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).

Reply to Objection 1. The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them. Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way of example, "by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done by."

Reply to Objection 2. The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few.

Reply to Objection 3. As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed according to reason.

So, the part which is highlighted in part g of the response is in fact these two paragraphs from the corpus:

It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.

Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).

But this does not seem very helpful, does it?

Unless the meaning intended is, "it is right to look to the magisterium of the past, but not in all cases" ... and the more you get into detail, the less it is so. Then the reference makes pretty good sense — and Raymund Burke's urge to make a request for clarification becomes clear. Michael Lofton pretended that Burke et al. were giving follow up questions about minutiae, when in fact, the man known to some as "Pope Francis" is deftly hinting at a thing but refusing to tie himself down to it, in this part g.

Unfortunately, while the choice of reference is a very good hint at what he considers correct, namely (insofar as the reference is clarifying me, or presumably anyone else) that less important things can be reinterpreted even in contradiction to previous magisterium, and a thing previously thought important can suddenly be downgraded to less so, and therefore unexpectedly also be reinterpreted, the reference as such is not a good proof for this idea.

"But if the reference doesn't prove this idea, why conclude that this is what he hinted at?"

Well, because even failures of logic have their logic.

I will now underline two more parts of this response.

(b) Therefore, while it is true that Divine Revelation is immutable and always binding, the Church must be humble and recognize that it never exhausts its unfathomable richness and needs to grow in its understanding.
(c) Consequently, she also matures in the understanding of what she herself has affirmed in her Magisterium.

In my experience, this has by other people (decades earlier) been used as gobbledegook for "if it doesn't suit us anymore, we can change it, and if the change contradicts previous magisterium, we can pretend that the previous magisterium was so far misunderstood." Or in other words, calling out whoever confronts with Bible, Tradition or Previous Magisterium in an attitude of "how do you have infinite knowledge of all that the Church means by Her magisterium?" Because if anything can in principle be seen as an incomplete expression, misleading as it stands, and a definite number of items turn out to be so, one would have to have infinite knowledge to conclude what one was oneself referring to was not one of those cases.

But this brings us to another point. There is a difference between the Natural Law and Revelation. For application of the Natural Law, each man is ultimately responsible, and God will reward or punish him accordingly, and it does not always help to claim one was obeying, obedience is not the one and sole virtue one really is responsible for. However, for the content of the Revelation, there are officers and there are orders. And tthere is an order in how they are to be obeyed so as to avoid the thing the French army describes as "ordre, contrordre, désordre" ... The Natural law is laid down in the heart of each man individually, and remains there unless darkened. But Revelation has to be revealed by someone. I am not Moses on Mount Sinai or before the burning Bush, nor am I Thomas verifying with my fingers it is really Jesus' wounds on the cross on this living and healthy body. I get these things, and lots more too, from others. And the further back they are, the more reliable they are. Let's see this distinction both from St. Thomas here, and from the Bible.

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is not common to all men; because, as it is written (Romans 10:16), "all do not obey the gospel." Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.

Objection 2. Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men.

Reply to Objection 1. The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them. Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way of example, "by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done by."

Reply to Objection 2. The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few.

Come to think of it, it is possible that the reference in part g of the response was to the pair 2ndum / ad 2ndum.

Which could then mean that things people try to uphold against him as "principles" are in fact "conclusions having rectitude in the majority of cases" ... as he sees it.

But the point was actually about Objection 1. From the fact that "the natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel" one cannot conclude that past expressions of the magisterium are faulty, for instance in upholding a Biblical chronology in the Christmas reading or in rejecting Heliocentrism in the Galileo case.

And Galileo brings us to a point in the response, which is very damning.

Here is Dei Verbum 7:

7. In His gracious goodness, God has seen to it that what He had revealed for the salvation of all nations would abide perpetually in its full integrity and be handed on to all generations. Therefore Christ the Lord in whom the full revelation of the supreme God is brought to completion (see 2 Cor. 1:20; 3:13; 4:6), commissioned the Apostles to preach to all men that Gospel which is the source of all saving truth and moral teaching, (1) and to impart to them heavenly gifts. This Gospel had been promised in former times through the prophets, and Christ Himself had fulfilled it and promulgated it with His lips. This commission was faithfully fulfilled by the Apostles who, by their oral preaching, by example, and by observances handed on what they had received from the lips of Christ, from living with Him, and from what He did, or what they had learned through the prompting of the Holy Spirit. The commission was fulfilled, too, by those Apostles and apostolic men who under the inspiration of the same Holy Spirit committed the message of salvation to writing. (2)

But in order to keep the Gospel forever whole and alive within the Church, the Apostles left bishops as their successors, "handing over" to them "the authority to teach in their own place."(3) This sacred tradition, therefore, and Sacred Scripture of both the Old and New Testaments are like a mirror in which the pilgrim Church on earth looks at God, from whom she has received everything, until she is brought finally to see Him as He is, face to face (see 1 John 3:2).

While a salvific purpose is given for the revelation in general, it is not stated that what doesn't immediately seem relevant for a salvific purpose does not fall under for instance perpetuation of the preaching of the apostles or under tradition or under Biblical inerrancy or under Magisterial infallibility.

Here is what the one responding makes of it:

what cannot change is what has been revealed "for the salvation of all peoples"

This reading of Dei Verbum, whether intended or not by any or some or even all (but probably not all, after all) Council Fathers, is at variance with Trent, Session IV.

Let's remind us — as there is a difference between simply "tenet" and "tenuit atque tenet" — we are not obliged to what obviously reinterprets and overthrows the obvious meaning of previous utterances from the Church.

Hans Georg Lundahl
Paris
St. Francis of Assisi
4.X.2023